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the IP world, becoming tiny information providers that are directly addressable by any
Internet-connected party. To protect the information gathered by sensors from any poten-
tial attacker on the Internet, it is essential to have trustworthy real-time information about
the legitimacy of every attempt to interact with a sensor. Our approach to address this
issue is Ladon, a new security protocol speciﬁcally tailored to the characteristics of low
capacity devices. In this paper, we study the performance of Ladon, showing that it success-
fully meets the requirements of the targeted environments. To that end, we evaluate the
delay and energy consumption of the execution of Ladon. The obtained results show that
the cost of Ladon is bounded, even in situations of high packet loss rates (20–80%) and
comparable to that of other protocols that implement fewer security features.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Currently, the native integration of severely resource-deprived devices, such as sensors, in the IP world is already a reality.
A key enabler of such environments is the 6LoWPAN approach [1], which aims to deﬁne how IP-based communications can
be efﬁciently carried over IEEE 802.15.4 links. The fact that sensors become globally addressable in the Internet opens the
door to the development and deployment of countless new applications, such as remote monitoring of patients [2] im-
planted with health sensors, in which any IP entity can establish an end-to-end communication with a sensor.
One of the most important hurdles to the widespread implementation of sensor-based applications is the protection of
the information they manage. This issue entails the necessity of implementing security mechanisms that provide authenti-
cation and authorization of remote peers, as well as the necessity of ensuring the integrity and conﬁdentiality of the trans-
mitted information. This is complicated by the fact that typical sensors present severe constraints regarding processing
power, storage and energy.
With the goal of providing resource-deprived devices with a suitable security protocol, we have developed Ladon [3], a
novel security protocol that implements end-to-end authentication, authorization and key establishment functionalities at
the application level. Taking into account the severe limitations of the environments for which Ladon has been designed, it is
essential to prove its suitability. In this paper, we seek to carry out this proof with a detailed study regarding the impact of
the execution of the Ladon protocol, based on an analytical model. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate two crucial performance param-
eters: the delay introduced by Ladon in establishing a secure connection and the energy consumed by the protected sensor asu.es (M.
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suitable for the targeted environments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review on related work, while Section 3 provides infor-
mation on preliminary concepts. Then, in Section 4 we describe the Ladon protocol and in Section 5, we present its perfor-
mance evaluation. Finally, in Section 6, we highlight the most remarkable conclusions of our work.
2. Background and related work
The implementation of security mechanisms in sensor environments is a very active research area. Among the proposed
approaches, there are initiatives aimed at the efﬁcient implementation of cryptographic operations [4–7] and approaches
focused on the efﬁcient distribution of cryptographic keys [8–10]. Due to the severe limitations of the targeted environ-
ments, the developed protocols are each aimed at solving a speciﬁc issue. Therefore, they are very tightly linked to the char-
acteristics of sensor networks and are not extensible to scenarios where access requests are originated outside such
networks.
Regarding traditional security mechanisms, public key infrastructures are unsuitable for sensors, mainly due to the high
resource consumption that they entail. With respect to mechanisms that solely make use of symmetric key cryptography,
the Kerberos [11] protocol presents an interesting approach, mainly due to its centralized user account management. How-
ever, Kerberos does not address all of the security requirements presented by IP-enabled sensors, basically due to two rea-
sons. First, Kerberos requires time synchronization, which implies the necessity of additional communication to periodically
query time servers and which can render the protocol vulnerable to some security attacks. Second, Kerberos lacks authori-
zation functionalities, which are essential in the considered scenarios.
For all of these reasons, the Ladon protocol [3] has been developed, based on the Kerberos architecture but tailored to the
speciﬁc characteristics of resource-deprived devices. To the best of our knowledge, Ladon is the ﬁrst protocol speciﬁcally de-
signed to protect the data collected by sensors from illegitimate access originated by any entity connected to the Internet.
3. Preliminary concepts
3.1. Overview of Kerberos
Because Ladon is a protocol based on Kerberos, it is worth reminding some of the basic terminology and features of Kerb-
eros. Each client or service is referred to as a principal in Kerberos, and each principal owns a secret key shared with the Kerb-
eros Key Distribution Centre (KDC). The operation of Kerberos is based on the use of tickets, a capability distributed by the
KDC that contains a proof of the identity of the principal that requested it.
Therefore, each client that wants to authenticate to a server needs a ticket issued by the Kerberos KDC for that service. To
that aim, the client ﬁrst authenticates against the Kerberos Authentication Server (AS) and obtains a long-term ticket known
as a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). This ticket allows the client to securely communicate with the Kerberos Ticket Granting
Server (TGS), which is in charge of issuing the actual Service Tickets. To avoid replay attacks, Kerberos includes timestamps
in tickets and messages, requiring permanent clock synchronization among the interacting entities.
3.2. Comparison between Kerberos and Ladon
Ladon requires including two new information stores in the KDC: an Active Connections Information Base, to assess the
freshness of tickets and messages, and an Authorization Information Base, to store authorization policies. Table 1 provides
a concise comparison between Kerberos and Ladon.
4. Description of the Ladon protocol
This section provides a brief review of Ladon. Fig. 1 depicts the protocol operation and Table 2 details the contents of the
exchanged messages. As shown in Fig. 1, Ladon entails three different phases: the authentication phase, the authorization
phase and the service access phase, which are brieﬂy described next. Readers desiring a more detailed description of Ladon
are referred to [3], where a security validation of the protocol is also included.Table 1
Comparison between Kerberos and Ladon.
Kerberos Ladon
Targeted protected devices Powerful workstations Severely resource-deprived devices
Authentication and key establishment functionality U U
Authorization functionality  U
Independence of clock synchronization  U
Fig. 1. Basic architecture and messages exchanged by the Ladon protocol.
Table 2
Detail of the content of Ladon messages.
Message Direction Content
LDN_AS_REQ C? AS: IDCkIDTGSkLifetime1kNonce1
LDN_AS_REP AS? C: IDCkTicketTGSk{KC,TGSkNonceC,TGSkNonce1kIDTGS} KC where,
TicketTGS = {KC,TGSkIDCkNonceC,TGS} KTGS
LDN_TGS_REQ C? TGS: IDSkLifetime2kNonce2kTicketTGSkAuthNTGS where,
AuthNTGS = {IDCk NonceC,TGS + i} KC,TGS
LDN_AP_IND TGS? S: IDSkIDCkNonceC;SkLifetime2kKiS;TGSkMACðKS ; IDCkKiS;TGSkNonceC;SkLifetime2Þ
LDN_AP_IND_REQ S? TGS: IDSkNonce3kMAC(KS,IDSkNonce3)
LDN_AP_IND_REP TGS? S: IDSkKiþ1S;TGSkMACðKS ; IDSkNonce3kKiþ1S;TGSÞ
LDN_TGS_REP TGS? C: IDCkTicketSk{KC,SkNonceC,SkNonce2kIDS} KC,TGS where,
TicketS = {KC,SkIDCkNonceC,SkAuthZ} KS
AuthZ = {RoleID} KS
LDN_AP_REQ C? S: TicketSkAuthNSkNonce4 where,
AuthNS = {IDCkNonceC,SkSubkey} KC,S
LDN_AP_REP S? C: {NonceC,SkSubkeykNonce4}KC,S
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The main goal of Ladon is to provide end-to-end authentication and authorization. However, several requirements spe-
ciﬁc to the characteristics of the targeted environments must also be addressed: energy efﬁciency, to maximize battery life;
independence of clock synchronization, to avoid periodically querying time servers; support for multi-level access policies,
to allow the enforcement of different access levels; resistance to message losses, to face protocol message losses; and
centralized management of users and permissions, to allow the creation and enforcement of dynamic access policies without
having to load them individually in each protected sensor.4.2. Authentication phase
In the authentication phase, the client principal obtains a TGT that allows him to prove his identity to the Ladon TGS in
order to obtain as many Service Tickets as he may need during the validity period of the TGT. To that aim, the client sends a
LDN_AS_REQ message specifying his own identity (IDC), and the Authentication Server responds with a LDN_AS_REP mes-
sage conveying a new TGT and a new nonce value (NonceC,TGS), which is also stored in the Active Connections Information
Base along with the client’s identity. Associated with this entry, a lifetime is established with initial value Lifetime1. After this
lifetime expires, the entry is deleted, and thus the ticket containing the deleted nonce value is no longer valid. In this way,
the possibility of old tickets being used as valid credentials is avoided.
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In the authorization phase, the client principal asks the TGS for a Service Ticket by means of a LDN_TGS_REQ message
including the TGT obtained from the LDN_AS_REP message (TicketTGS). However, the TGT by itself is insufﬁcient to authen-
ticate a client, since TGTs can be resent. Therefore, an authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of tickets.
After validating the received LDN_TGS_REQ message, the TGS veriﬁes if the requesting client principal is authorized to
access the desired service by querying the Authorization Information Base. This point constitutes an important difference
with respect to Kerberos, where Service Tickets are provided to all authenticated principals. Next, the TGS sends a
LDN_AP_IND message to the targeted service principal running on a sensor, specifying all of the information it will need
afterwards to validate the LDN_AP_REQ request message. The service principal stores this information for a time Lifetime2,
and if the expected request from the client principal is not received before this time elapses, the service principal deletes the
corresponding information in order to avoid overﬂowing the small storage capacity of the sensor.
An important aspect of Ladon is how LDN_AP_IND messages are authenticated. To this end, a mechanism based on one-
way key functions is used. Each time the TGS sends a LDN_AP_IND message to a given service principal (S), it embeds a new
value of a previously generated one-way key chain. The service principal, owning a value of the key chain Ki1S;TGS
 
, cannot
calculate the next value KiS;TGS
 
, due to the characteristics of one-way functions. However, it can authenticate the received
LDN_AP_IND message by checking that F KiS;TGS
 
¼ Ki1S;TGS. To provide each service principal with the ﬁrst value of the key
chain, the LDN_AP_IND_REQ/_REP exchange is used.
Lastly, the TGS responds to the client with a LDN_TGS_REP message including the requested Service Ticket (TicketS).
4.4. Service access phase
In the service access phase, the client principal requests access to the data provided by the sensor through a LDN_AP_REQ
message. This message includes the previously obtained Service Ticket, which identiﬁes the client as an authenticated and
authorized party. The service principal validates the LDN_AP_REQ message using the information provided by the TGS in the
LDN_AP_IND message. After a positive validation, the service principal responds to the client with a LDN_AP_REP message
either accepting the key proposed in the request message (subkey) or proposing a new one. This key can be used afterwards
to derive further encryption and integrity keys.
4.5. Recovery mechanisms
As wireless links are prone to packet losses, it is essential to implement efﬁcient recovery mechanisms. For the exchanges
started by the LDN_AS_REQ, LDN_TGS_REQ, LDN_AP_REQ and LDN_AP_IND_REQ request messages, the designed recovery
mechanisms consist in retransmitting the given request if the expected response does not arrive within a predeﬁned time
frame.
However, thismechanism is not valid for LDN_AP_INDmessages, because they lack an associated response. Themechanism
used in this case relies on the properties of one-way functions and is more efﬁcient than any procedure involving message
retransmissions. The service principal successively applies the one-way function to the received KjS;TGS value, and if any of
the obtained results coincidewith its stored value, the server accepts themessage and stores the receivedKjS;TGS value.However,
if after themaximumnumber of attempts to compute the one-way function, the service principal is still unable to validate the
received KjS;TGS value, a more expensive mechanism must be used, consisting of the LDN_AP_IND_REQ/_REP exchange.
5. Performance evaluation: time and energy consumption
In this section, we detail the performance evaluation of our protocol, demonstrating its applicability to the targeted sen-
sor devices. To this end, we evaluate the delay introduced by the protocol for the establishment of a secure connection and
the energy consumed by the sensor during this process.
5.1. Modelled scenario and assumptions
For our study, we consider a beacon-enabled cluster-tree structure of the IEEE 802.15.4 network. In the envisioned topol-
ogy, there is a PAN coordinator with three sub-coordinators, and each sub-coordinator has three child coordinators. Each
cluster consists of 6 sensor devices with a service principal running in each sensor. Therefore, a total of 54 service principals
exist in the network, with a 3-hop depth from the PAN coordinator to any of the service principals. Fig. 2 represents a single
branch of the considered IEEE 802.15.4 network. The other two identical branches have been omitted.
For the sake of simplicity, we omit the authentication phase, because it is only performed once during the validity lifetime
of the TGT and does not involve any resource-deprived device. Additionally, for the computation of end-to-end transmission
delays only the delays introduced by the IEEE 802.15.4 network have been considered, as the delay introduced by the
Internet connection is commonly orders of magnitude smaller.
Fig. 2. Topology of the considered network scenario.
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Fig. 3 shows the different time intervals that affect the establishment of a secure connection. As can be seen in the ﬁgure,
each message entails a generation time (SXi), a transmission time (tni), a queue waiting time in the destination entity (WXi)
and a processing time (SXi). Therefore, the delay to establish a secure session can be represented in the following way:DSS ¼ ðR1 þ 1ÞðE½WC1 þ SC1 þ tn1 þ E½WTGS1 þ STGS1 þ STGS2 þWTGS2 þ STGS3 þ tn3 þ E½WC2 þ SC2Þ þ ðR2 þ 1ÞðSC3
þ tn4 þ E½WS2 þ SS2 þ SS3 þ tn5 þ E½WC3 þ SC4Þ þ 1L þ
L 1
L
PQL
 
ðR3 þ 1ÞðSS4 þ tn6 þ E½WTGS3 þ STGS4 þ STGS5
þ tn7 þ E½WS3 þ SS5Þ ð1Þ
where E[WX] denotes the expectation of the WX queue waiting time, PL represents the packet loss probability in the IEEE
802.15.4 network, L denotes the length of the one-way key chain and Q denotes the maximum number of attempts to
successively execute the one-way function. Additionally, R1, R2 and R3 represent the expected number of LDN_TGS_REQ,
LDN_AP_REQ and LDN_AP_IND_REQ retransmission attempts, respectively. These values are calculated in the Appendix.
From Eq. (A.1), we conclude that R1 ’ 0. That is, LDN_TGS_REQ messages are not retransmitted.
In the considered context, it is reasonable to assume that all of the messages received by the client principal spend the
same average time waiting to be served (E[WC]). The same happens in the service principal (E[WS]). However, in the case of
the TGS,WTGS2 takes a ﬁxed value different from E[WTGS1] and E[WTGS3], becauseWTGS2 is a ﬁxed guard interval used to ensure
that the LDN_AP_REQ message does not arrive at the service principal until the corresponding LDN_AP_IND has been re-
ceived and processed.
Therefore, to calculate WTGS2, we consider the worst case scenario, in which the LDN_AP_IND message arrives at the ser-
vice principal after the last allowed retransmission attempt (K) and cannot be implicitly authenticated after Q executions of
the one-way function, and the LDN_AP_IND_REQ is retransmitted for the maximum allowed attempts (M).WTGS2 P tn2 þ E½WS þ KðE½WTGS þ STGS2 þ tn2 þ E½WSÞ þ SS1jQattemptsþ ðM þ 1ÞðE½WS þ SS4 þ tn6 þ E½WTGS
þ STGS4 þ STGS5 þ tn7 þ E½WS þ SS5Þ  E½WS  STGS3  tn3  E½WC   SC2  SC3  tn4  E½WS ð2ÞFig. 3. Time sequence of the establishment of a Ladon secure connection.
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To calculate the service times corresponding to the processing or generation of messages, we consider constant rates for
the execution of cryptographic operations in each entity. We therefore calculate the SXi parameters of Eq. (1) as:Table 3
Lengths
Mes
LDN
LDN
LDN
LDN
LDN
LDN
LDN
LDN
LDNSXi ¼ jCRYPðMessageÞjTCRYPX ð3Þwhere jCRYP(Message)j denotes the length of the ﬁelds to be cryptographically processed and TCRYPX denotes the crypto-
graphic operations execution rate of entity X. Table 3 summarises the lengths of Ladon protocol messages, along with the
number of bytes that are subject to cryptographic operations in each entity. These ﬁgures have been computed assuming
16-byte cryptographic keys, 8-byte nonces and 2-byte identity ﬁelds.
5.2.2. Transmission time analysis
To compute the transmission times (tni values in Eq. (1)), we consider the delays introduced by the three wireless hops of
the IEEE 802.15.4 network, including a backoff time (DBOT) and a data transmission time (DTx):tni ¼
X3
l¼1
DlBOT þ DlTx ð4ÞTo calculate the backoff time, we follow the model proposed in [12]. We ﬁrst calculate the probability (q) that a transmission
of a given type of Ladon message is detected by Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) during the Contention Access Period (CAP)
as a function of the message length, the CAP length (tCAP) and the data rate of the wireless link (R). We then calculate the
average amount of data transmitted during CAP (d) for each coordinator. As an example, Eqs. (5) and (6) represent the q
and d values corresponding to the LDN_AP_IND messages routed by the PAN coordinator (C0):qAP IND ¼
jLDN AP INDj
tCAPR
ð5Þ
dC0AP IND ¼ k0NSNCE½LDN AP INDtCAP ð6Þ
Here jLDN_AP_INDj denotes the length of the LDN_AP_IND message and E[LDN_AP_IND] as calculated in Eq. (A.2). Addition-
ally, NC and NS represent the number of clients and servers in the network, respectively, and k0 denotes the average rate at
which each client generates access requests to each server. Therefore, the probability of detecting a clear channel by CCA (pc)
is independently calculated for each coordinator:pC0c ¼ ð1 qAP INDÞd
C0
AP IND
ð1hÞ  ð1 qAP IND REQ Þd
C0
AP IND REQ
ð1hÞ  ð1 qAP IND REPÞd
C0
AP IND REP
ð1hÞ  ð1 qAP REQ Þd
C0
AP REQ
ð1hÞ
 ð1 qAP REPÞd
C0
AP REP
ð1hÞ ð7Þ
where h represents the probability that two randomly deployed nodes in the coverage range of a given coordinator have a
hidden node relationship.
If the CCA is unsuccessful, the backoff algorithm is repeated up to a maximum of b attempts. The probability of a success-
ful CCA (s) and the average number of backoff attempts (r) are calculated in the following way:sC0 ¼
Xb
a¼1
pC0c 1 pC0c
 ða1Þ ð8Þ
rC0 ¼ ð1 sC0 Þbþ
Xb
a¼1
apC0c 1 pC0c
 ða1Þ ð9Þof Ladon protocol messages and the number of bytes over which each entity must perform cryptographic operations.
sage type Length (bytes) Bytes subject to cryptographic operations
Client principal (bytes) KDC (bytes) Service principal (bytes)
_AS_REQ 15 – – –
_AS_REP 62 34 60 –
_TGS_REQ 47 10 36 –
_AP_IND 33 – 27 27
_AP_IND_REQ 14 – 10 10
_AP_IND_REP 22 – 26 26
_TGS_REP 63 34 62 –
_AP_REQ 61 26 – 54
_AP_REP 32 32 – 32
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3
2
rC0 ðtIR þ tCCAÞ þ
XrC01
a¼0
tBOðminðmacMinBEþ a; aMaxBEÞÞ ð10Þwhere tIR is the idle to receive transition time, tCCA is the CCA analysis time and tBO(BE) is given by Eq. (11), where tBOP is the
backoff length.tBOðBEÞ ¼ 2
BE  1
2
tBOP ð11ÞLastly, the actual transmission time of each message is calculated considering a constant transmission rate for the IEEE
802.15.4 wireless link (R).
5.2.3. Waiting time analysis
Wemodel the three entities (client and service principals and TGS) as M/G/1 queues, because they process variable length
messages and thus the service times can be represented with a general distribution. As before, we consider NC clients gen-
erating requests according to a Poisson distribution with mean rate k0 to the each of the NS servers in the network. The mean
arrival rates of jobs (k) to each entity are expressed as:kC ¼ 3NSk0 þ ðR2 þ 1ÞNSk0 ð12Þ
kTGS ¼ NSNCk0 2þ ðL 1ÞL þ
1
L
ðR4 þ 1Þ þ 1L ð1 PLÞðR3 þ 1Þ þ
ðL 1Þ
L
PQL ð1 PLÞðR3 þ 1Þ
 	
ð13Þ
kS ¼ NCk0 ðL 1ÞL þ
1
L
ðR4 þ 1Þ
 	
ð1 PLÞ þ ð1 PLÞðR2 þ 1Þ þ 1L þ
ðL 1Þ
L
PQL
 
½ðR3 þ 1Þ þ 1

 
ð14ÞSimilarly, for each entity we calculate the average service time ðXÞ as follows:XC ¼ SC1 þ SC2 þ SC3 þ SC4ðR2 þ 1Þ3þ ðR2 þ 1Þ ð15Þ
XTGS ¼
STGS1 þ STGS2 L1L þ 1L ðR4 þ 1Þ
 þ STGS3
2þ L1L þ 1L ðR4 þ 1Þ þ 1L þ L1L PQL
 
ð1 PLÞðR3 þ 1Þ
þ
STGS4 1L þ L1L PQL
 
ð1 PLÞðR3 þ 1Þ
2þ L1L þ 1L ðR4 þ 1Þ þ 1L þ L1L PQL
 
ð1 PLÞðR3 þ 1Þ
ð16Þ
XS ¼
E½SS1 L1L þ 1L ðR4 þ 1Þ
 ð1 PLÞ þ ðSS2 þ SS3Þð1 PLÞðR2 þ 1Þ
L1
L þ 1L ðR4 þ 1Þ þ ðR2 þ 1Þ
 ð1 PLÞ þ 1L þ L1L PQL ½ðR3 þ 1Þ þ 1
þ
SS4 1L þ L1L PQL
 
ðR3 þ 1Þ þ SS5 1L þ L1L PQL
 
L1
L þ 1L ðR4 þ 1Þ þ ðR2 þ 1Þ
 ð1 PLÞ þ 1L þ L1L PQL ½ðR3 þ 1Þ þ 1 ð17Þ
Lastly, the average waiting time in queue for each entity (X) is the following:E½WX  ¼ kXX
2
X
2ð1 qXÞ
ð18Þwhere qX ¼ kXXX denotes the server utilization.
5.3. Energy consumption
To evaluate the energy consumed by a sensor to establish a secure connection, we take into account the energy consumed
by transmission and reception of bits over the air, as well as by the execution of cryptographic operations. Fig. 4 represents
the Ladon message exchanges, indicating the operations that imply energy consumption in the protected sensor. Therefore,
the total amount of energy consumed for establishing a secure session is the following:eSS ¼ L 1L þ
1
L
E½LDN AP IND
 	
ð1 PLÞRS1 þ L 1L þ
1
L
E½LDN AP IND
 	
ð1 PLÞ SS1 þ E½Hash þ 1L þ
L 1
L
PQL
 
½E½LDN AP IND REQ ðSS4 þ TS2Þ þ RS3 þ SS5
 	
þ E½LDN AP REQ ð1 PLÞðRS2 þ SS2 þ SS3 þ TS1Þ ð19Þ
Table 4
Parame
Para
L
Q
W
K
M
V
TCRY
TCRY
TCRY
k0
NS
Fig. 4. Causes of energy consumption in a protected service principal.
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L
1 PQL
  ð1 PQL Þ  QPQL ð1 PLÞ
ð1 PLÞ H þ
1
L
þ L 1
L
PQL
 
QH ð20Þbeing H the energy consumed by one execution of the one-way function.
To calculate the average energy consumed due to the transmission and reception of bits, we take into account the length
of Ladon messages as gathered in Table 3, a constant transmission rate (R) and independent instantaneous power consump-
tions for the reception (PRX) and transmission (PTX) operations. In the case of the transmission operations, we also consider
the energy consumed during the backoff process, which is calculated as in [12].
Similarly, to calculate the energy consumed during cryptographic processing, we assume constant bit rates and consider
constant instantaneous power consumption (PC) during the execution of such operations.5.4. Results and discussion
We use Eqs. (1) and (19) to evaluate the mean delay and energy consumption of a secure session establishment as func-
tions of the packet loss probability in the IEEE 802.15.4 network. For the sake of obtaining numerical results, we use the
parameterisation summarized in Tables 4–6.
As shown in Fig. 5a and b, the time needed for a secure session establishment is bounded and within an acceptable limit
even for high packet loss situations in which the different protocol messages are retransmitted multiple times. The same
result is found for the amount of energy consumed by the protected sensor devices. In the case of very high packet loss prob-
abilities, very few of the transmitted messages arrive at their destination and therefore, the energy consumed by the pro-
tected sensors is drastically reduced, because they do not expend energy in the corresponding reception and processing
operations or in the transmission of the associated response messages. Additionally, the average delay does not tend to inﬁn-
ity because the number of retransmissions of each type of message is bounded. In such cases, the probability that the secure
session is successfully established is very small.
With the objective of comparing Ladon with similar approaches, we have modelled Kerberos and the SPINS-based key
exchange protocol presented in [6], as they are the closest ones to Ladon in terms of functionality. Speciﬁcally, the SPINS-
based protocol relies on using the base station as a trusted third party so that two sensors within the same network can agreeters used for the performance analysis and their values.
meter Description Value
Length of the one-way key chain 100
Maximum number of one-way function execution attempts 10
Maximum number of retransmissions of LDN_TGS_REQ messages 1
Maximum number of retransmissions of LDN_AP_IND messages 2
Maximum number of retransmissions of LDN_AP_IND_REQ messages 1
Maximum number of retransmissions of LDN_AP_REQ messages 8
PC Cryptographic operations performance rate of the client principal 1 Mbps
PS Cryptographic operations performance rate of the service principal 50 Kbps
PTGS Cryptographic operations performance rate of the TGS 2 Mbps
Job generation rate of each client principal 1 request/min
Number of service principals 54
Table 5
Parameters used for modelling IEEE 802.15.4 links.
Name Description Value
tCAP Duration of the CAP period 61.44 ms
R Wireless link data rate 250 Kbps
h Hidden node relationship probability 41%
b Maximum number of backoff attempts 4
tIR Idle to receive transition time 192 ls
tCCA CCA analysis time 128 ls
macMinBE Initial value of the backoff exponent 3
aMaxBE Maximum value of the backoff exponent 5
tBOP Backoff period length 320 ls
Table 6
Characterization of energy consumption in sensor nodes.
Name Description Processor mode Radio mode Value (mW)
PRX Power consumption in reception mode Active Rx 74.4
PTX Power consumption in transmission mode Active Tx (0dBm) 65.7
PC Power consumption in cryptographic processing mode Active Idle 5.4
Fig. 5. Analysis of the energy and time consumed to establish a Ladon secure session.
J. Astorga et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering 40 (2014) 539–550 547upon a shared key. We have chosen this protocol for the comparison because out of the key exchange protocols speciﬁcally
designed for sensor networks, it is the most easily extensible to more generalist scenarios.
The scenario considered for the comparison corresponds to the most demanding of the previously evaluated situations:
100 clients sending requests at an average rate of k0 = 1requests/min. The results gathered in Fig. 6a show that the time
needed to establish a secure session using Ladon is longer than the time needed by the other two evaluated protocols. How-
ever, this time is still limited and is acceptable for the considered scenarios. As an example, for a wide range of packet loss
probabilities, the delay introduced by Ladon is lower than the maximum allowed response time for a web server [13]. In this
sense, it must be remarked that Ladon provides additional authorization functionality, while the other two compared pro-
tocols do not.
On the other hand, Fig. 6b shows that in an ideal situation (PL = 0), the energy consumed by Ladon is slightly higher than
the energy consumed by the other two protocols but is in a comparable range. If packet losses occur, which is a common
situation in sensor networks, the energy consumption of Ladon becomes similar to the energy consumed by Kerberos and
lower than the energy consumed by the protocol introduced in [6]. Fig. 6b shows that for common packet loss rates in sensor
networks (20–80%) [14], Ladon consumes about 15% less energy than the SPINS-based protocol. We therefore demonstrate
Fig. 6. Analysis of the time and energy consumed by different protocols to establish a secure session.
548 J. Astorga et al. / Computers and Electrical Engineering 40 (2014) 539–550that in a real situation, Ladon outperforms alternative key establishment protocols speciﬁcally designed for sensor
environments.
6. Conclusions
We have presented the security needs that must be addressed before sensors can be securely integrated into the IP world.
As a suitable alternative to address these needs, we propose Ladon, a protocol based on Kerberos but speciﬁcally tailored to
the requirements of sensor environments. We have evaluated the time and energy overhead introduced by Ladon when
establishing a secure connection. The obtained results demonstrate that the protocol is well tailored to the requirements
of the targeted resource-deprived environments in real network situations, i.e., in situations where the packet losses in
the network are frequent.
We lastly have compared the performance of Ladon with that of protocols that implement even more limited character-
istics (they lack authorization mechanisms), such as Kerberos and a protocol based on SPINS. Although Ladon introduces a
longer delay than the other two protocols, the difference is negligible for the application context considered for our protocol.
Regarding energy consumption, the obtained results show that it is comparable for the three evaluated protocols, and in
cases of high packet loss probability, the amount of energy consumed by Ladon is lower than the energy consumed by
the protocol based on SPINS. This fact proves that Ladon deals more efﬁciently with packet losses in the network.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that Ladon is a time- and energy-efﬁcient solution and is thus feasible for address-
ing security in targeted resource-deprived environments.
Appendix A. State transition modelling
Fig. A depicts the state transition models of the participating entities, where PL denotes the packet loss probability in the
IEEE 802.15.4 network, Y, W, V, K and M denote the maximum allowed number of retransmissions for LDN_AS_REQ,
LDN_TGS_REQ, LDN_AP_REQ, LDN_AP_IND and LDN_AP_IND_REQ messages, respectively, and L represents the length of
the one-way key chain. We next calculate the average number of transmission attempts of each request message assuming
that each occurrence of loss of a given type of message is random and mutually independent.E½LDN TGS REQ  ¼ R1 þ 1 ¼
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Fig. A. State transition models of the TGS, service principal and client principal.
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